Volume 37 Issue 5
Oct.  2021
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LI Xin-tian, WANG Cheng-hong. Legal Adjustment of Investor Protection in Compulsory Delisting[J]. Journal of University of Science and Technology Beijing ( Social Sciences Edition), 2021, 37(5): 543-552.
Citation: LI Xin-tian, WANG Cheng-hong. Legal Adjustment of Investor Protection in Compulsory Delisting[J]. Journal of University of Science and Technology Beijing ( Social Sciences Edition), 2021, 37(5): 543-552.

Legal Adjustment of Investor Protection in Compulsory Delisting-From the Perspective of CSISC Shareholding Exercise

  • Received Date: 2021-03-19
    Available Online: 2021-09-13
  • Publish Date: 2021-10-25
  • In line with the reform of the registration system for stock issuance, China’s delisting system is steadily advancing in the direction of “normalization”. In the process of establishing a normalized delisting mechanism, the mandatory delisting system is clearly the focus of reform at the national regulatory level, and has shown a trend of refinement. However, China’s initiatives on investor protection in the delisting system are lacking and have become a shortcoming that hinders the healthy development of the capital market. In the specific environment of high speculative nature, high turnover rate and many individual investors in China’s capital market, the system mainly composed of early compensation and share buyback is not enough to effectively protect small and medium-sized investors and boost market confidence. In view of this, in the process of improving the mandatory delisting system, the role of CSI Investment Service with unique Chinese characteristics in investor protection should be given full play, with its bonding function between private law enforcement and public regulation as the main line, using the right to collect rights, negotiate agreements, apply for mediation, file lawsuits and other rights granted by the Securities Law, in order to reduce the cost of small and medium-sized investors to defend their rights and strengthen the effect of investor rights protection.

     

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