Methodological Dilemmas and Outlets of Phenomenal Consciousness Research

WANG Zhenhua; FANG Jiale; QU Yang

doi:10.19979/j.cnki.issn10082689.2023010035

Volume 41 Issue 1

Feb. 2025

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WANG Zhenhua, FANG Jiale, QU Yang. Methodological Dilemmas and Outlets of Phenomenal Consciousness Research[J]. Journal of University of Science and Technology Beijing ( Social Sciences Edition), 2025, 41(1): 120-128. doi: 10.19979/j.cnki.issn10082689.2023010035

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WANG Zhenhua, FANG Jiale, QU Yang. Methodological Dilemmas and Outlets of Phenomenal Consciousness Research[J]. Journal of University of Science and Technology Beijing ( Social Sciences Edition), 2025, 41(1): 120-128. doi: 10.19979/j.cnki.issn10082689.2023010035

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Methodological Dilemmas and Outlets of Phenomenal Consciousness Research

doi: 10.19979/j.cnki.issn10082689.2023010035

School of Philosophy and Social Development, Shandong University, Jinan 250100, China

Received Date: 2023-01-13
Publish Date: 2025-02-01

Abstract

Abstract

The problem of phenomenal consciousness is an important topic in current philosophical debates, but how to approach it properly remains tricky. Typically, identifying states of phenomenal consciousness inevitably requires reports. Without reports, does phenomenal consciousness still exist? Regarding whether cognitive access partly constitutes phenomenal consciousness, the NCC (Neural Correlates of Consciousness) approach suggests that both active-report and no-report paradigms carry different categories of confounding risks. On the other hand, the natural kind approach in causal research is overly idealized in terms of identifying the number of clusters. However, comparatively, the natural kind approach allows for more theoretical development and remains open to the empirical domain. In the final section of the paper, I will respond to criticisms of the natural kind approach, demonstrating that it is suitable for studying the problem of phenomenal consciousness.
- phenomenal consciousness,
- access consciousness,
- methodological dilemma,
- NCC,
- natural kind

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References(21)

References

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