Research on the Endogenous Logic and Governance Approach of Bribery in Chinese Private Enterprises from the Perspective of Law and Economics

Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China, the governance of bribery in private enterprises has gone through a lenient approach in the planned economy era, severe punishment during the construction of a socialist market economic system, and a governance model of both leniency and severity after entering the new era, which is in fact, this changing trend is in line with China’s economic transition. The development process is closely linked. From the perspective of law and economics analysis, factors such as long-term negative externality policy orientation, rational economic man’s profit-seeking choices, and poor connection of intervention mechanisms under public choice theory will all make it easier for private economies to exploit institutional loopholes to pay bribes to obtain business benefits. Therefore, to optimize and improve the bribery governance model of China’s private enterprises, we need to focus on the shortcomings of the current governance model in governance policies, crime and punishment systems, and institutional connection, and transform into a comprehensive governance framework that combines points and aspects. With a complex crime and punishment system that combines pre-punishment and coordination, we will formulate industry integrity behavior norms for comprehensive governance and help eradicate the conditions that breed bribery.