现象意识研究的方法论困境与出路

王振华; 方家乐; 曲扬

doi:10.19979/j.cnki.issn10082689.2023010035

现象意识研究的方法论困境与出路

doi: 10.19979/j.cnki.issn10082689.2023010035

山东大学哲学与社会发展学院，济南 250100

基金项目: 国家社科基金重点项目“人工意识的哲学问题研究”（编号：18AZX007）。

详细信息

作者简介:
王振华（1988—），山东菏泽人，山东大学哲学与社会发展学院哲学博士研究生

方家乐（1990—），安徽亳州人，山东大学哲学与社会发展学院博士研究生

曲扬（1991—），山东淄博人，山东大学哲学与社会发展学院博士研究生

中图分类号: B089
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- 被引次数: 0
出版历程
- 收稿日期: 2023-01-13
- 刊出日期: 2025-02-01

Methodological Dilemmas and Outlets of Phenomenal Consciousness Research

School of Philosophy and Social Development, Shandong University, Jinan 250100, China

摘要

摘要: 现象意识问题是当前哲学研究的重要话题，但如何研究却是相当棘手。通常要确定现象意识状态不可避免的需要报告，如果没有了报告，现象意识是否还存在？对于认知取用是否部分地构成了现象意识，相关性研究的NCC^①进路表明主动报告与无报告的范式都存在不同类别的混淆风险；因果性研究的自然类进路则在簇数量识别问题上过于理想化。但是，相比之下，自然类进路可以容纳更多的理论发展空间，且对经验领域保持开放。文章最后，我将对自然类进路反驳予以回应，表明自然类进路在研究现象意识问题上是适用的。
- 现象意识 /
- 取用意识 /
- 方法论困境 /
- NCC /
- 自然类
Abstract: The problem of phenomenal consciousness is an important topic in current philosophical debates, but how to approach it properly remains tricky. Typically, identifying states of phenomenal consciousness inevitably requires reports. Without reports, does phenomenal consciousness still exist? Regarding whether cognitive access partly constitutes phenomenal consciousness, the NCC (Neural Correlates of Consciousness) approach suggests that both active-report and no-report paradigms carry different categories of confounding risks. On the other hand, the natural kind approach in causal research is overly idealized in terms of identifying the number of clusters. However, comparatively, the natural kind approach allows for more theoretical development and remains open to the empirical domain. In the final section of the paper, I will respond to criticisms of the natural kind approach, demonstrating that it is suitable for studying the problem of phenomenal consciousness.
- phenomenal consciousness /
- access consciousness /
- methodological dilemma /
- NCC /
- natural kind
注释:

1) 2NCC（Neural Correlate of Consciousness），意识的神经关联物。

2) 1注释：我们正在采用一个更广泛的自然类概念，根据这个概念，任何支持归纳律则或自然律结果的自然属性都被视为自然类。

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参考文献(21)

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