Initiation Conditions of the Compliance Non-prosecution Inspection ProcessTaking the Typical Cases of Enterprise Compliance Reform Pilot of the Supreme People’s Procuratorate as a Sample
-
摘要: 2021年6月和12月,最高人民检察院先后发布了两批企业合规典型案例,展示了检察机关适用合规不起诉制度,通过第三方监督评估机制督促和帮助企业进行合规整改和合规建设,保障企业稳定发展的实践探索。为保障合规不起诉制度的公平适用和合规考察的顺利进行,应当对合规不起诉考察程序的启动设置一定条件。对涉案企业启动合规考察程序应当满足三个条件:首先,涉案企业应当认罪认罚,承认指控的犯罪事实;愿意接受刑事或行政处罚,积极配合侦查并进行内部自查,采取相关恢复或补救措施。其次,企业应当具有合规能力,能够正常经营,保证合规考察的顺利进行和稳步推进。最后,企业应当作出合规承诺,承诺进行合规整改,加强合规建设,积极配合合规监管工作。Abstract: In June and December 2021, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate issued two batches of model cases of enterprise compliance, showing that the procuratorial organs apply the compliance non-prosecution system, through the third-party supervision and evaluation mechanism to supervise and help enterprises to carry out compliance rectification and compliance construction to ensure the stable development of enterprises. In order to ensure the fair application of the compliance non-prosecution system and the smooth progress of the compliance inspection, certain conditions should be set for the start-up of the compliance non-prosecution inspection procedure. Three conditions should be met for initiating the compliance inspection procedure for the enterprise involved in the case: First of all, the enterprise involved in the case should plead guilty and admit the facts of the alleged crime; be willing to accept criminal or administrative punishment, actively cooperate with the investigation and conduct internal self-investigation, and take relevant restoration or remedial measures. Secondly, the enterprise should have the compliance ability, be able to operate normally, and ensure the smooth progress and steady progress of the compliance inspection. Finally, enterprises should make compliance commitments, promise to carry out compliance rectification, strengthen compliance construction, and actively cooperate with compliance supervision.
-
[1] 陈瑞华. 企业合规出罪的三种模式[J]. 比较法研究,2021(3):69-88. [2] 最高人民检察院. 最高检发布企业合规改革试点典型案例[EB/OL]. (2021-6-3)[2022-3-11]. https: //www.spp.gov.cn/spp/xwfbh/wsfbh/202106/t20210603_520232.shtml. [3] 最高人民检察院. 企业合规典型案例(第二批)[EB/OL]. (2021-12-15)[2022-4-20]. https: //www.spp.gov.cn/spp/xwfbh/wsfbt/202112/t20211215_538815.shtml#2. [4] 陈瑞华. 企业合规不起诉改革的八大争议问题[J]. 中国法律评论,2020(4):1-29. [5] 张军. 最高人民检察院工作报告−2021年3月8日在第十三届全国人民代表大会第四次会议上[J]. 中华人民共和国最高人民检察院公报,2021(2):1-10. [6] 李勇. 检察视角下中国刑事合规之构建[J]. 国家检察官学院学报,2020,28(4):99-114. doi: 10.3969/j.issn.1004-9428.2020.04.007 [7] 李玉华. 以合规为核心的企业认罪认罚从宽制度[J]. 浙江工商大学学报,2021(1):61-71. doi: 10.14134/j.cnki.cn33-1337/c.2021.01.006 [8] 魏晓娜. 背叛程序正义——协商性刑事司法研究[M]. 北京: 法律出版社, 2014. [9] 陈卫东. 从实体到程序:刑事合规与企业“非罪化”治理[J]. 中国刑事法杂志,2021(2):114-126. doi: 10.19430/j.cnki.3891.2021.02.007 [10] 朱孝清. 企业合规中的若干疑难问题[J]. 法治研究,2021(5):3-17. doi: 10.3969/j.issn.1674-1455.2021.05.001 [11] 陈瑞华. 论协商性的程序正义[J]. 比较法研究,2021(1):1-20. [12] 陈瑞华. 刑事诉讼的合规激励模式[J]. 中国法学,2020(6):225-244. doi: 10.14111/j.cnki.zgfx.2020.06.012 [13] MCCONNELL R D. Plan now or pay later:the role of compliance in criminal cases [J]. Houston Journal of International Law, 2011, 33(3):509-588. [14] 陈瑞华. 企业合规不起诉制度研究[J]. 中国刑事法杂志,2021(1):78-96. [15] 潘志成. 美国《反海外腐败法》最新发展及企业合规启示[EB/OL]. (2019-11-27)[2022-3-18]. https: //mp.weixin.qq.com/s/L8RDBni8mYaL4ttg5Tg_pg. [16] 黎宏. 合规计划与企业刑事责任[J]. 法学杂志,2019,40(9):9-19. [17] 陈卫东. 认罪认罚从宽制度研究[J]. 中国法学,2016(2):48-64. [18] 赵恒. 刑事合规计划的内在特征及其借鉴思路[J]. 法学杂志,2021,42(1):66-79. [19] 叶伟忠. 检察环节构建涉罪企业合规考察制度的探讨[J]. 人民检察,2021(5):32-36. doi: 10.3969/j.issn.1004-4043.2021.05.009 [20] 徐日丹. 促进“严管”制度化, 防范“厚爱”被滥用[N]. 检察日报, 2021-04-09(001). [21] 李本灿. 企业视角下的合规计划建构方法[J]. 法学杂志,2020,41(7):76-83. doi: 10.16092/j.cnki.1001-618x.2020.07.009
点击查看大图
计量
- 文章访问数: 463
- HTML全文浏览量: 310
- PDF下载量: 58
- 被引次数: 0