Virtue Epistemology's Response to Three Main Problems of Generic Reliabilism
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摘要: 过程可靠论认为确证源自于可靠的信念形成过程,但它无法保证外在过程的可靠性必然与主体的内在确证相联系,这就会产生新恶魔问题与元不一致问题。同时,过程可靠论还面临着如何明确规定这种过程的普遍性,使之能够运用于具体场合的问题,即普遍性问题。对于这三大难题,索萨的德性知识论以“理智德性”为核心概念,通过构造确证与适切的区分、动物知识与反思知识的区分,形成了颇具创见的解决方案。然而,索萨的方法未能弥合可靠性与确证之间的差距,对动物知识和反思知识各自的价值维度界定不明,且对认知者要求过高。因此,虽然索萨的德性知识论为解决三大难题提供了新思路,但其本身也尚待完善。Abstract: According to process reliabilism, the justificatory status of a belief depends on the reliability of the belief-formation process, while it can't guarantee the reliability of the process to be bound to believer's justification, which will lead to the new evil-demon problem and the meta-incoherence problem. Besides, process reliabilism also faces the generality problem, that is how to define the universality of this process so that it can be applied to specific occasions. Taking intellectual virtue as the core concept, through the distinction between justification and aptness, animal knowledge and reflective knowledge, Sosa proposed a new response to these problems. However, Sosa is failed to bridge the gap between reliability and justification, his demands are too strict for believers, and the definition of the value of animal knowledge and reflective knowledge is unclear. Therefore, although virtue epistemology broadens our thinking to solve the three problems, it also leaves some problems to be discussed.
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